Supreme Court Rules Employee’s Oral Complaint is Protected under FLSA
Wednesday, March 23rd, 2011In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that oral complaints constitute protected conduct under the antiretaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Kevin Kasten brought this lawsuit against his former employer, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., alleging it located its timeclocks between the area where Kasten and other workers donned (and doffed) work-related protective gear and the area where they carry out their assigned tasks. He further alleges that Saint-Gobain fired him because he orally complained to management about the location of the timeclocks. The sole question before the court was whether “filed any complaint” also includes oral complaints. Holding that it does, Justice Breyer wrote:
Filings may more often be made in writing. See, e.g., Ritter v. United States, 28 F. 2d 265, 267 (CA3 1928) (finding words “file a claim for refund” to require a written request in context of tax code). But we are interested in the filing of “any complaint.” So even if the word “filed,” considered alone, might suggest a narrow interpretation limited to writings, the phrase “any complaint” suggests a broad interpretation that would include an oral complaint. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. , (2009) (slip op. at 7). The upshot is that the three-word phrase, taken by itself, cannot answer the interpretive question.
…
Several functional considerations indicate that Congress intended the antiretaliation provision to cover oral, as well as written, “complaint[s].” First, an interpretation that limited the provision’s coverage to written complaints would undermine the Act’s basic objectives. The Act seeks to prohibit “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U. S. C. §202(a). It does so in part by setting forth substantive wage, hour, and overtime standards. It relies for enforcement of these standards, not upon “continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls,” but upon “information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288, 292 (1960). And its antiretaliation provision makes this enforcement scheme effective by preventing “fear of economic retaliation” from inducing workers “quietly to accept substandard conditions.” Ibid.
…
Second, given Congress’ delegation of enforcement powers to federal administrative agencies, we also give a degree of weight to their views about the meaning of this enforcement language. . . . The Secretary of Labor has consistently held the view that the words “filed any complaint” cover oral, as well as written, complaints.
The Court held in this 6-2 opinion (with Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting and Kagan not taking part) that the FLSA prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who make oral, as well as written, complaints to their employer. Had the Court ruled that only workers filing written complaints were protected, workers would be deterred from using informal methods to address violations of the law by their employer. Instead, the opinion bolsters the level of protection afforded employees who report workplace violations of the FLSA.



